The Supreme Audit Court has stated in a report that since 1403, the application of exceptions without transparent rules at the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade has enabled the formation of a monopoly in the mobile phone import process and concentrated it in the hands of four specific companies.
According to the report, in one case, an import order registration worth more than 96 million dollars, equivalent to more than one-quarter of the permitted quota, was allocated without observing the legal cap and without entering the eight-digit base identifier and code of the goods, relying solely on a commitment to build an agricultural-industrial complex; this while, according to the Supreme Audit Court, the mentioned project had no physical progress.
This supervisory body has considered the manner of applying exceptions contrary to the law, discriminatory among importers and disruptive of the principle of competition, and has announced it will pursue reform of the relevant mechanisms. The question now is that alongside investigating this case, what mechanism exists to prevent repetition of such decisions and which bodies are responsible for supervising the implementation of regulations and their possible amendment?
How do exceptions turn into special privileges?
The first axis of review is the decision-making method at the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade. If import order registrations were made outside general rules and through use of exceptions, it is necessary to determine on what legal basis these exceptions were defined, which authority or unit had the power to apply them, and according to what criteria the requests benefiting from this privilege were evaluated.
In the mentioned case, citing a commitment to build an agricultural-industrial complex to allocate a significant portion of mobile phone import registration raises questions about the proportionality of the commitment offered to the privilege granted. The Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade must explain what mechanisms existed to verify such commitments and how compliance with legal caps and equal opportunity for applicants to import were ensured.
Of course, to determine individuals' responsibility, decision-making documents and the results of legal investigations must be examined. A report from a supervisory body can be the basis for demanding answers, but determining each person's responsibility requires examining their role in the decision-making process and establishing misconduct by the competent authority.
Are existing laws sufficient to prevent monopoly?
Alongside the responsibility of the executive body, the issue can also be examined from a legislative perspective. If existing regulations have allowed broad exceptions or decision-making without transparent criteria, it must be determined whether the problem stems from defects in the law, ambiguity in bylaws, weak supervision over enforcement of regulations, or deviation from existing rules.
This distinction is important; because if clear regulations have been violated, the main focus should be addressing the performance of the executive body and enforcing legal guarantees. But if there are gaps in laws or executive regulations that allow granting non-transparent privileges, amending those gaps can also be put on the agenda.
From this perspective, the mobile phone import case is an opportunity to examine whether the rules related to quota allocation, order registration and application of exceptions are sufficiently transparent, measurable and subject to oversight. Also, whether the criteria for receiving special privileges have been defined in a way that minimizes the possibility of discrimination among economic actors.
What responsibility does the Parliament have vis-à-vis supervisory reports?
The Islamic Consultative Assembly can pursue this issue through legislation and oversight. In oversight, the Industry and Mines Commission of Parliament can, within its legal powers, ask the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade to explain the method of allocating import quotas, the basis for applying exceptions and actions taken to remove the grounds for monopoly.
In legislation, if reviews show that existing regulations lack sufficient transparency or there is ambiguity in defining the limits of executive authority, representatives can consider amending relevant laws or pursuing amendments to executive regulations; provided that the source of the problem is clearly identified first and amending the law does not replace investigating possible violations of current regulations.
Meanwhile, the important question is whether Parliament will be content with case-by-case follow-up of the Supreme Audit Court's report or will turn review of allocation and order registration mechanisms into an opportunity to evaluate the rules governing competition in this market. Answering this question can clarify how parliamentary oversight moves from demanding explanation about a specific case to pursuing reform of problematic procedures.
Of course, until the official position of the Industry and Mines Commission or other relevant authorities about this case is announced, one cannot report Parliament's definite involvement or a decision to amend laws.
From identifying misconduct to determining responsibility
Another issue is the fate of the case and the outcome of supervisory actions. Announcing that a mechanism is contrary to the law, while a step toward clarification, does not answer questions about the responsibility of decision-makers, the effects of the decision made, and how to prevent its recurrence.
The Supreme Audit Court must explain the latest status of its investigation, actions taken to determine possible responsibilities, and how it is following up on reforming the mentioned mechanism. The Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade must also specify whether the import order in question is still valid, what action has been taken to examine the provided commitment, and whether procedures related to applying exceptions have been reviewed.
It should also be made clear whether other similar privileges have been granted through the same mechanism and, if similar cases exist, what measures are planned to review them.
Ultimately, the mobile phone import case is not only about the method of granting a single import order; it raises a broader question about the relationship between executive authority, regulatory transparency, oversight by responsible bodies and the legislator's role in preventing the formation of non-competitive privileges. Now it remains to be seen what explanations the Ministry of Industry, Mine and Trade will provide, the result of the Supreme Audit Court's follow-ups, and Parliament's position on this case, and whether these follow-ups will lead to determining possible responsibilities, reforming problematic procedures and strengthening transparency in the import process or not./ ISNA