Behzad Akbari, Deputy Minister of Communications, Chairman of the Board and CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, said today in his press conference in response to a question about domain sanctions, especially against AI platforms by countries claiming internet freedom: this issue is very key and noteworthy; unfortunately in past years less attention has been paid to the dimensions of external restrictions, while their scope has been expanding and intensifying day by day.
He added: one of our main priorities since starting work at Telecommunication Infrastructure Company has been to enhance network visibility and transparency (Visibility) so we can accurately monitor data flows and events within the network. One objective of this measure was to assess the extent to which sites used by Iranian users face sanction barriers.
Akbari stressed: we now have a monitoring system that continuously, 24 hours a day, observes hundreds of thousands of domains from the world’s most famous and top visited domains (Top Domains). Findings from this monitoring show that exactly close to 31 percent (30 point some tenths percent) of these domains are closed to Iranian users.
Major share of direct sanctions alongside malware contamination of equipment
The CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, explaining technical causes of this blocking, said: most of these restrictions stem from direct sanctions and a small share is also related to malware contamination of some users’ devices in the country. Monitoring systems can well distinguish whether a domain blocking is implemented by the destination server or is being rejected at edge clouds due to widespread equipment contamination. Nevertheless, the dominant share of these restrictions is undoubtedly due to sanctions.
He noted: most major international platforms, from all Google APIs to well-known AI services like ChatGPT and Grok, are blocked for users inside the country. In addition, many non‑American platforms, concerned about criminal liability and consequences of US sanctions, reject requests originating from Iranian IPs and close their services to Iranians.
Intersection of international pressures with domestic restrictions and users’ plight
Akbari, referring to additional pressures on users, emphasized: when we put this volume of external sanctions alongside domestic restrictions and policies, the number of blockings for Iranian society increases significantly.
He continued: an Iranian user, even if not seeking sensitive or restricted platforms and only intending to perform a normal activity, faces a dead end; whether a software developer (Developer) and programmer, a researcher, or an ordinary citizen wanting to use common international services, they encounter the sanction barrier. Most of these services are B2C (directly supplied to the end consumer) which are urgently needed by researchers, producers and businesses, but access to them has been removed.
Clear paradox of those claiming free flow of information
The Chairman of the Board of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, seriously criticizing Western double standards, said: countries that talk about free access to information and digital services and proclaim support for the Iranian people have in practice closed 30 percent of the world’s web services to our people; a behavior that is not justifiable by any of their claims and in our view is completely condemnable.
He added: on the other hand, simultaneous exposure of users to restrictive domestic policies means they have no option but to use circumvention tools; an action that itself creates many challenges, risks and security troubles for users.
Blocking of children’s online games even if subscription is paid
The Deputy Minister of Communications pointed to the reach of sanctions down to recreational services and low age groups and said: there is a long list of widely used online game platforms whose audience are Iranian children and adolescents, but access to them is blocked. Even though Iranian families and children are willing to pay foreign currency and subscription fees to these platforms, they still face closed doors.
Network capacity expansion from transit revenues under difficult currency conditions
Akbari continued the session and in response to a question comparing the current situation with the period before the Dey month incidents, emphasized the need to distinguish between two indicators “bandwidth capacity” and “transiting traffic” and said: network traffic has certainly declined, but bandwidth capacity has always been developed in line with demand.
He explained: from the start of the government’s period until before the Dey-month events, more than 50 percent traffic growth occurred in the country’s network and accordingly international capacity was upgraded. We have no shortage in technical capacity; although all our international settlements are in foreign currency and given exchange rate fluctuations we have tough financial conditions, by using revenues from data transit sales we have continuously advanced international capacity development.
Damage to fiber optic cables between Iran and Qatar and Iran and Oman
The CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, referring to physical damages to communications infrastructure due to regional developments and war, said: part of the country’s communications capacity was unfortunately lost due to cuttings; including the fiber optic link between Iran and Qatar which was cut during tensions and war and temporarily removed a large volume of capacity.
He added: also one of the fiber lines between Iran and Oman went out of operation following a strike and damage to our communication station in Jask. In addition, the last active fiber link in the Persian Gulf area also experienced an outage on Friday. However, necessary technical actions were immediately taken and these capacities were restored through alternative routes; therefore the country has no problem in terms of international bandwidth capacity.
90% traffic recovery; one terabit per second diverted to unofficial routes
Akbari about the trend of network traffic consumption noted: before the Dey-month events, international traffic growth in the country was above 50 percent, a record higher than the global annual average growth (25 percent); but after the Dey incidents, the imposed war and restrictions, this trend stopped.
The Deputy Minister of Communications stated: recovery has now begun and about 90 percent of past international traffic volume is restored. The existing 10 percent drop does not necessarily mean reduced need and network consumption; rather, according to our assessments during the war and imposition of restrictions a portion of traffic exited official gateways and went to unofficial routes that have not yet returned. Estimates indicate this drop equals about one terabit per second (1Tbps) which is currently flowing over unofficial infrastructures.
The Deputy Minister of Communications and CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, continuing the press conference while analyzing service quality status in the country’s network, reported serious technical gaps in both mobile and fixed sections.
Answering questions about latency in the mobile network he said: in the mobile network, user latency from the infrastructure network during off‑peak hours (such as 4:30 AM) is about 35 milliseconds, but during peak consumption hours this figure averages 95 milliseconds. This means the network has problems during high‑traffic hours due to various reasons including insufficient operator investment and the need to restructure according to demographic and capacity changes.
He further, referencing the fixed network situation, revealed an infrastructural crisis in this sector and said: we still have over 7 million ADSL ports in the country whose link quality at best reaches only 16 megabits. The worrying point is that this volume of ports covers only 30 percent of required capacities and their quality is not at contemporary standards.
Akbari emphasized that today’s users need high‑quality and stable bandwidth to use social media and new platforms, but the current fixed network structure faces serious challenges in meeting these needs.
Vicious cycle of VPN; when restrictions destroy service quality
The CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, pointing to existing policies, reported a “vicious cycle” in the network resulting from the intersection of restrictions and tools to bypass them.
He said: due to domestic restrictions and implemented policies, Iranian users have been forced to use VPN tools. This has caused service quality on the one hand to be severely harmed and on the other hand increased switching between different IPs, especially in free VPNs, is very high.
He added: maximal combat against these tools is impossible because many of these tools share IPs with legitimate services and any severe restriction on one IP leads to disruption of thousands of other services. Consequently, this vicious cycle keeps service quality low and users to improve their situation resort again to unofficial tools.
Iran’s internal network; an “infected network” with massive daily attacks
Akbari in the cybersecurity section, describing the role of the infrastructure company as a Carrier and its responsibility in national division of labor, reported shocking statistics existing in the network.
Volume of cybersecurity incidents
He said: “we face a huge volume of security incidents daily. On average daily 150 to 180 thousand security incidents from outside to inside and between 250 to 300 thousand incidents from inside to inside are recorded.”
Referring to the health status of the internal network, he stated: the very high volume of "inside to inside" incidents shows that unfortunately our network is an "infected network." This volume of internal incidents is abnormal and can be exploited in the international arena as well.
The Deputy Minister of Communications, responding to a question about the ability to counter recent heavy attacks, emphasized: the infrastructure company at the international layer detects and mitigates DDoS attacks from outside the country in real time. Last week one of the largest cyber attacks in the world occurred which we successfully countered and no direct and tangible impact on domestic services was observed.
Delay in reopening the internet; a process under control of the Government’s Special Headquarters for Organizing and Steering Cyberspace
Akbari in response to another reporter’s question about the reason for the prolonged return of traffic to normal levels (3 months delay to reach 90 percent) and the influence of factors like the authentication system (Shahkar) and the impeachment atmosphere, said: “returning to normal has been a phased process. Although some statistics may differ, the main reason for delay in full reopening has been implementation of the policies approved by the Government’s Special Headquarters for Steering Cyberspace. Decisions at this level are made by the Headquarters and executing their instructions has been time‑consuming.
He also on the topic of authentication said: authentication itself is a standard and correct procedure in many countries of the world, but certainly this process and applying related restrictions has slowed the return to normal conditions.
New dimensions of sanctions; alarm for SSL security certificates and digital platforms
Akbari, referring to concerns of the expert community and users about cancellation of general licenses (such as revocation of General License G overseeing academic exchanges by the US Treasury and the possibility of its extension to D‑1 license related to internet technologies), said: cyber sanctions against our country have broad dimensions and recently we have faced new forms and facets of it that are completely unfair and unscrupulous. Worldwide access to cyberspace and beyond, protection of data and privacy are considered fundamental rights of users; but unfortunately with legal and technical instruments even this basic right is being taken away from the Iranian people.
He called revocation of digital security certificates (SSL Certificates) by international certificate authorities (CAs) one of the serious threats facing Iranian businesses and said: “the challenge of certificate revocation, especially by European and American CAs, is a real threat. Iranian businesses to remain safe from this crisis must move away from dependence on a single CA; they are required to implement precise multi‑architecture, implement load balancing solutions and move towards use of international CAs that are non‑American and non‑European so their users do not face service interruption.
The Deputy Minister of Communications regarding banks’ approach to using local root certificates (Local CA) stated: “use of internal root centers only solves part of the issue in native applications and Android systems; but for users who must use web browsers and other operating systems, it will create security errors and blocking. Despite all these pressures, the country’s digital structure will not reach a dead end, but it requires flexible and intelligent solutions from technical managers.
Political and security deadlock in repairing fiber optic cables in the Persian Gulf and Qatar
The CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, in response to a question about causes of high latency for users and especially gamers and the effect of network control layers, pointed to details of geopolitical obstacles in regional waters: most of the country’s internet traffic is supplied from Europe and the geographic distance between Iran and European data centers naturally entails at least 80 milliseconds round trip time (RTT). To solve gamers’ latency problems and reduce ping we had established a direct connection with servers and cloud platforms located in the region via Qatar submarine cable which unfortunately suffered a physical cut.
Akbari explained obstacles to repairing this communication artery and said: ownership of this cable belongs to a Qatari company and due to the rupture occurring in Kuwait waters, complex legal permissions are required; on the one hand the counterpart does not permit dispatch of Iranian ships and technical teams for repair operations and on the other, international and foreign companies due to security conditions and regional tensions do not dare to approach waters around Iran to repair the cable. Simultaneously we were trying to activate a new transit line through Oman to distribute traffic and compensate for the damage which unfortunately that link also faced an outage and currently intensive technical and diplomatic negotiations are underway to remove these obstacles.
Infrastructure gap in mobile and fixed; monthly 25GB consumption and zero percent share of 5G
The Chairman of the Board of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, comparing Iranian users’ bandwidth consumption with international patterns, said: average data consumption per Iranian user on the network is between 23 to 25 gigabytes per month. This consumption volume is roughly on par with North America and Europe; while in the southern Persian Gulf countries it is about 40 to 45 gigabytes and in India and Nepal close to 35 gigabytes. Therefore there is no meaningful difference in raw consumption demand between our users and the world.
He identified the fundamental and critical distinction of Iran’s internet structure in the inverted network share pattern and emphasized: internationally the exploitation ratio of internet is about 70 percent on fixed networks and 30 percent on mobile networks; but in Iran due to historical lag in fixed network development this ratio has exactly reversed and over 70 percent of traffic has fallen on the mobile network. This imbalance has put severe pressure on the mobile network.
Meanwhile insufficient revenues and the tariffing system have prevented proportional operator investment; to the extent that while 50 percent of the world’s consumed traffic is currently exchanged over fifth generation (5G), 5G internet share in Iran remains close to zero percent.
Dead end of current filtering policies; the approach to cyberspace governance must be transformed
The Deputy Minister of Communications, answering repeated reporters’ questions about the fate of promises regarding lifting filtering and obstacles ahead, explicitly criticized the inefficiency of blocking approaches and said: actions and follow‑ups in this regard have always been and will be on the agenda of the Ministry of Communications; but it must be seen clearly that decision‑making in this domain is not solely in the hands of one ministry and multiple influential and expert bodies participate in this field. Even currently some groups and schools of thought seriously believe that no easing should occur in the network.
Filtering and imposing heavy economic costs on household baskets
Akbari noted: our official stance is that current applied policies have not been effective and this inefficiency can be decisively proven. No one denies states’ sovereignty to protect psychological security and vulnerable groups in cyberspace and this approach is common worldwide; but this extent of broad restrictions has not only failed to achieve policy makers’ goals, it has backfired and resulted in imposing heavy economic costs on household baskets, psychological erosion of users and deepening social dissatisfaction; proof of this is the widespread presence of people and officials on these very restricted platforms.
The CEO of Telecommunication Infrastructure Company, emphasizing the necessity of a strategic shift at the macro level of the country, said: the world is rapidly advancing toward new technologies. If all our time, energy and concern get stuck on which platform should remain closed and which should open, we will be diverted from our main mission which is developing the country’s foundational and technological infrastructures. The time has come to fundamentally transform our perspective and discourse in cyberspace governance.